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IV

INTRODUCTION
The central issue of this appeal is the book value of Roger Eggett's stock.
However, substantial portions of Eggett's response brief address his compensation, his
termination, and Wasatch Energy's supposed bad faith, none of which is at issue on this
appeal. Wasatch does not contest those portions of the jury verdict pertaining to
compensation and termination, and the verdict does not rest on, or even mention, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Liability under the verdict is based entirely on
the Shareholders' Agreement. Wasatch does not dispute that it owes Eggett the book
value of his stock. The only issue is how that book value should be determined.
Under the undisputed terms of the Shareholders' Agreement, Eggett agreed that
the book value established in the Company's audited financial statement would be
"binding and conclusive" on the parties. (Add. 28.) That audited financial statement set
the book value of Eggett's stock at $27,540. (Add. 63; 36.5 percent of total stockholders'
equity.) Over the objections of Wasatch counsel, Eggett was permitted to make
"adjustments" to total stockholders' equity in order to increase the book value of his own
stock. Based on those adjustments, the jury verdict set the book value of Eggett's stock at
$49,520. (Add. 8; 36.5 percent of Company book value, found by the jury to be
$135,671.96.) Judge David Young, believing that verdict figure to be low, then altered
the special verdict question to award Eggett the full $135,671.96 as the book value of his
own stock. (Tr. 989-94.)

Wasatch has demonstrated in its opening brief that Eggett is bound by the book
value of $27,540, as established in the audited financial statement. Judge Young erred in
admitting Eggett's adjustments to Company book value and, accordingly, in refusing to
direct the verdict in that agreed amount of $27,540. (Br. of App. 13-21.) Alternatively,
Eggett and Judge Young were bound by the book value of $49,520, as established by the
jury verdict. Judge Young erred in altering the special verdict question to increase the
verdict to $135,672. (Br. of App. 21-34.) In addition, the district court erred in awarding
Eggett attorney fees for work on the employment and bad faith claims, for which fees are
not recoverable. (Br. of App. 35-37.)
ARGUMENT
As a preface to discussion of legal arguments, correction is required on certain
preliminary matters. First, Eggett asserts an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. (Br.
of Aplee. 1-2.) However, the district court has no discretion to ignore the provisions of a
binding contract, to alter a jury verdict that is clear on its face, or to award attorney fees
on claims for which fees are not recoverable. Those are all matters of law reviewed for
correctness. (Br. of App. 1-2.) Second, Eggett asserts that Wasatch failed to marshal
facts supporting the verdict. (Br. of Aplee. 4.) However, the marshaling requirement
applies only when challenging the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. E.g.,
Cambelt Infl Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987). Here, Wasatch does not
challenge the jury's verdict, but only seeks to enforce it as rendered on the verdict form.
Finally, Eggett refers repeatedly to supposed bad faith and challenges Wasatch's failure
2

to discuss the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Br. of Aplee. 7-13.) However, the
jury verdict was based solely on the contractual obligation to pay Eggett the book value
of his stock. The special verdict does not even mention bad faith or the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. In fact, the jury expressly found that Wasatch's conduct was not
willful, malicious, reckless, intentional, or fraudulent. (Special Verdict, Question 6, Add.
8-9.)
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING BOOK VALUE
ADJUSTMENTS INSTEAD OF DIRECTING THE VERDICT AT
THE VALUE ESTABLISHED IN THE AUDITED FINANCIAL
STATEMENT.

In its opening brief, Wasatch demonstrated that Eggett is bound by the terms of the
Shareholders' Agreement, which makes the book value in the audited financial statement
"binding and conclusive upon the parties." (Para. 18(d), Add. 28.) Based on this contract
provision, the trial court erred by refusing to direct the verdict at that audited book value
and instead permitting Eggett to offer "adjustments" to book value. (Br. of App. 13-21.)
A,

Eggett's Adjustments Were Presented to Increase Book Value.
Eggett does not dispute that the parol evidence rule prohibits his book value

adjustments for the purpose of circumventing the "book value" definition in the
Shareholders' Agreement. Rather, he argues that his book value adjustments were
admitted only to prove bad faith, not to circumvent the contract. (Br. of Aplee. 15-22.)
However, this argument is transparently disingenuous. Eggett's book value adjustments
were presented for the clear purpose of increasing Company book value above the figure

3

established in the audited financial statement. By increasing Company book value,
Eggett would increase the value of his own stock. While Eggett alleged breach of the
covenant of good faith, he sought no separate recovery under that theory at trial. (See
Special Verdict form.) Therefore, the only application of the adjustments was to increase
the book value of his stock.
The record plainly shows that Eggett's purpose in adjusting Company book value
was to increase his own book value. In his pretrial motion to compel discovery of the
adjustments, Eggett's counsel affirmed: "This information is necessary to calculate the
book value of Eggett's shares

" (R. 117.) At trial, in opposing Wasatch's motion in

limine to exclude evidence of adjustments to book value, Eggett's counsel argued that the
adjustments were relevant "in establishing book value of [Eggett's] shares" and should be
"considered in determination of book value." (Tr. 10.) Most importantly, Eggett
presented the adjustments at trial in the context of testifying on Company and personal
book value. (Tr. 255-89, 888-94.) Eggett's own trial exhibit shows that these
adjustments were intended and used to increase Company book value from the audited
figure of $75,452 to the fictitious figure of nearly $700,000. (Add. 52-53.) With these
adjustments, Eggett's own claimed book value skyrocketed by nearly ten times from
$27,540 to $255,419. (Id.) Accordingly, Eggett's assertion that these adjustments were
introduced and intended solely to prove bad faith is inherently incredible.

4

B.

Wasatch Was Entitled To A Directed Verdict On Book Value.
In any event, Eggett's attempt to relegate this argument to a mere evidentiary

dispute "misses the point." The purpose and effect of excluding Eggett's book value
adjustments was to obtain a directed verdict at the book value established in the audited
financial statement. Even if evidence of Eggett's adjustments to Company book value
were relevant to prove bad faith, the trial court still erred in refusing to direct the verdict
on the book value of Eggett's stock.
The Shareholders' Agreement plainly defined book value for departing
shareholders as the net shareholders' equity set forth in the Company's year-end audited
financial statement. (Add. 28.) By signing that agreement, Eggett assumed the risk that
the audited statement could be prepared contrary to his own judgment. See Crowder
Constr. Co. v. Riser, 517 S.E.2d 178, 188 (N.C. App. 1999) (mere differences in
accounting methods or judgment do not justify disregard of audited book value); Area,
Inc. v. Stentenfeld, 541 P.2d 755, 764 (Alas. 1975) ("technical variations" in determining
book value "cannot per se be deemed fatal errors"). Eggett made no allegation in his
complaint, and presented no proof, that the audited statement was not prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, or that it contained
I
mathematical errors, or that it resulted from any fraudulent or intentional act. Therefore,
book value as established in the audited statement must be accepted and enforced as a
matter of law. E.g., Crowder Constr. Co.} supra, at 195 (granting summary judgment to
former employer on stock-valuation claim); Swecker v. Rau, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3301
5

(D. Pa. 1990) (granting summary judgment on "book value" of stock); Area, Inc. v.
Stetenfeld, supra, at 764 ("as a matter of law the term 'book value5 has no fixed meaning,
the intent and understanding of the parties to the individual agreement must control");
Jones v. Harris, 388 P.2d 539, 542 (Wash. 1964) (parties are "bound" by "book value" as
defined by agreement and contained in financial statements).
At the close of evidence, Wasatch counsel moved for directed verdict on the book
value of Company stock, requesting that book value be decided as a matter of law, not by
the jury:
Your honor, this is my motion for a partial dispositive ruling at the
conclusion of the evidence. The ruling I'm asking for with regard to the
value of shares and book value I think Mr. Eggett testified that he
understood it to be a June 30 date that was intended and we agreed with
that. We have an audited statement that has specific dates. The agreement
requires that it be the audited statement from the auditors and the accrual
and general accepted accounting practices and such. Therefore, we feel that
that is the number that should be in here and that should not be left to the
jury. [Tr. 907, emp. added.]
The trial court denied the motion, as follows:
I believe that the plaintiff should have the opportunity to present
adjustments to that statement. He's not going to be specifically bound to
the audited statement of June 30 . . . . [H]e should be allowed to challenge
that and show that reasonable adjustments should be made to the financial
statements as then audited because of the, let's say, bias that had been
incorporated by discretionary calls of the officers.

. . . It just seems to me that it would be inequitable to require him to
simply accept an audited statement when that audited statement was
prepared after the time that he had been terminated
[Tr. 908-09, emp.
added.]
6

Thus, the trial court ruled directly contrary to the law, as set forth above and in
Wasatch's opening brief. (Br. of App. 13-18.) The court erroneously released Eggett
from his binding contract "on the basis of supposed equitable principles." See Dalton v.
Jerico Constr. Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982). The court erroneously admitted
extrinsic evidence to vary and circumvent the terms of the Shareholders' Agreement. See
Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 148 (Utah App. 1992); Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc.,
804 P.2d 547, 551-52 (Utah App. 1991). And the court erroneously rejected the book
value of Company stock as set forth in the audited financial statement. Mere "bias" or
differences of judgment are inherent in accounting records and present no legal basis to
disregard them. See Crowder Constr. and Area, Inc., supra. "Bias" is not the equivalent
of fraud or bad faith, as Eggett argues. (Br. of Aplee. 26.) Accordingly, this Court
should reverse the trial court's denial of Wasatch's motion for directed verdict and enter
judgment for the agreed book value of Eggett's stock in the amount of $27,540. See Rule
50(a); Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 1999 UT 14, 975 P.2d 467, 468 (reversing denial of
defendant's motion for directed verdict).
POINT II:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALTERING A JURY VERDICT
THAT WAS CLEAR ON ITS FACE AND NOT SUBJECT TO
CORRECTION.

Alternatively, Wasatch demonstrated in its opening brief that it is entitled by
constitution, statute, and rule to a jury determination of book value; that verdict questions
considered confusing or ambiguous must be corrected before submission to the jury, or be
deemed waived; and that the trial court has no authority to alter a clear jury verdict

simply because he may disagree with it. (Br. of App. 21-25.) Eggett does not dispute
these legal principles. Rather, he argues only that the verdict was unclear and that the
trial court was authorized to question the jury to "clarify" its intent. (Br. of Aplee. 2640.) However, Eggett's argument fails in its premise because the verdict was not unclear,
therefore, the court had no authority to probe the jury and alter the written verdict.
A.

The Jury Verdict Was Clear On Its Face.
The context and wording of Special Verdict Question 5 leave no question of its

meaning. The primary issue of the case, the only issue aside from compensation (which
is not in dispute), was the book value of Eggett's stock. Regarding the method to
calculate his book value, Eggett testified:
Q . . . Can you tell the jury how book value is to be calculated?
A . . . [Y]ou take the equity of the company and you multiply it by
my ownership interest, which was 36 /4%, so we have to determine the
amount of ownership equity that was in the company. [Tr. 256, emp.
added.]
Eggett's own trial exhibits followed this same formula, first determining total Company
book value, and then multiplying that value by 36.5 percent to derive Eggett's book value.
(Add. 51, 53.) Following that formula, Special Verdict Question 5 naturally asks the jury
for the "'book value' of Wasatch Energy." (Add. 8.) The question plainly does not ask
for the book value of Eggett's stock. Eggett's counsel apparently approved the question,
and neither counsel nor the court voiced any objection or question concerning its meaning
when the court read the verdict form to the jury prior to submission. (Tr. 927.) The clear
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understanding and intent of both counsel was to calculate Eggett's book value, after
receiving the verdict, by multiplying the jury's verdict of Company book value by 36.5
percent.
Accordingly, on its face, as well as in context of the evidence, Special Verdict
Question 5 is clear and unambiguous. It asks in plain, simple terms for "'the book value5
of Wasatch Energy" (emp. added), not for the amount due Eggett. Neither does the jury's
response create any ambiguity. The answer of "$135,671.96" is well within the range of
evidence presented by the parties. Wasatch demonstrated Company book value of
$75,452, as set forth in the audited financial statement (Add. 63; Tr. 573, 669), while
Eggett argued for an adjusted Company book value of $699,778 (Add. 53). Based on the
clear, unambiguous question and the jury's clear and rational response, Judge Young had
no basis to alter the question to reach a different result. In short, nothing about the
question or the response indicated a "possible mistake" or required "clarification."
Still, Eggett argues that the jury's answer to Question 5 had "two possible
interpretations" and that the court merely "polled the jurors" to clarify their intent. (Br. of
Aplee. 32, 27.) However, on the face of the verdict there was only one possible
interpretation, that $135,672 was "the 'book value' of Wasatch Energy" (emp. added),
just as the question plainly states. The percentage of that amount owed to Eggett was not
on the verdict form because it was stipulated to be 36.5 percent of Company book value,
an amount to be calculated later based on the jury verdict. It makes no difference that
"[t]he jury was not told or instructed" that Eggett's share would be derived from the

jury's finding of Company book value. (Br. of Aplee. 36.) Jury's are not required to
understand the legal significance of their factual determinations. E.g., Cooper v. Evans,
262 P.2d 278, 279, 281 (Utah 1953) (jury finding of contributory negligence was valid
although jury was "disappointed with the result" and "may not have understood the full
legal consequences of their findings").
Neither did Judge Young "poll" the jury. A jury is "polled," at the request of
either party, by "asking each juror if [the answer on the verdict form] is his verdict."
Rule 47(q). Here, neither party requested that the jury be polled, and Judge Young never
asked the jury if the answer to Question 5 was their verdict. Instead, he sua sponte asked
a revised question: "[I]s this the value that the jury believes should be paid for the
shares?" (Tr. 989.) The value to be paid for Eggett's shares was not on the verdict form
and is an entirely different question from the book value of the Company. Thus, Judge
Young did not poll the jury as to the verdict question, but instead posed his own,
misleading question. If the jury had been properly polled as to the actual Question 5 and
had responded that the answer was not their verdict, then the court may have directed
them to re-deliberate. But the court never gave the jury that chance. Instead, the court
simply revised the question himself and coerced jury assent to his new question. (See Br.
of App. 28-32.)
Eggett also argues that "[o]nce the jury foreman told the trial Court that
$135,671.96 was the book value to be 'paid for the shares,' . . . the error was patent and
obvious." (Br. of Aplee. 35-36.) However, this argument begs the question of the court's
10

authority to question the jury in the first place. Absent a facial error or ambiguity in the
verdict, the court had no business posing a revised question to the jury. In any event, the
jury foreman's first response is consistent with the answer to Question 5: "We believe
that [$135,672] to be the book value" (Tr. 990), presumably referring to the book value of
Wasatch Energy, as the written question states. When the court elicits a further response
with the words "And so—," the foreman adds, "Paid for the shares." {Id.) This second
response, stated in the past tense, leaves unclear whose shares are referred to because
neither Wasatch nor Eggett "paid" that amount for stock. The foreman did not say that
the amount listed was "to be paid" as Eggett asserts. (Br. of Aplee. 30, 41.) This
ambiguity did not justify further questioning, as the trial court cannot inquire into the
jury's deliberations or mental processes and thereby create ambiguity as a pretext to alter
the verdict to his own liking. Utah R. Evid. 606(b).
In summary, nothing was "unclear" about Special Verdict Question 5. It asked for
the "'book value' of Wasatch Energy," and the jury responded with the value of
$135,672. Plaintiff, having approved the verdict form, was bound by that verdict, and the
trial court erred by altering the question to change the meaning of the jury's answer. See,
e.g., First Security Bank v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1969) ("when
a party has demanded a trial by jury he is entitled to have the jury find the facts, and it is
not the trial court's prerogative to make findings inconsistent therewith and thereby defeat
the effect of the jury's findings"); EFCO Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, All P.2d 615, 61718 (Utah 1966) (unless error "is clearly shown," the "court should not upset a verdict
11

merely because it may disagree"); Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 152 P. 726,
727 (Utah 1915) (trial court erred in refusing to enter judgment on jury's verdict and
instead making findings of his own).
B.

Rule 47(r) Does Not Authorize Alteration of the Verdict.
Eggett argues that the trial judge had discretion to alter the verdict question

pursuant to Rule 47(r), Utah R. Civ. P. (Br. of Aplee. 34-41.) However, Eggett
completely misconstrues the language and judicial application of Rule 47(r).
Rule 47(r) states:
If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected
by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again.
[Emp. added.]
Eggett argues that the verdict was "informal" and "insufficient" because Judge Young
considered the written question "confusing" and "ambiguous" and considered the answer
a "mistake." (Br. of Aplee. 35.) However, as Wasatch has demonstrated, a special
verdict question considered "confusing" or "ambiguous" must be corrected before
submission to the jury or the objection is waived. Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a). (Br. of App. 2224.) Otherwise, any party dissatisfied with a verdict could argue after-the-fact to change
- the verdict because the question was unclear and the jury could not have intended the
answer it gave. Jury verdicts would be non-final and endlessly open to argument and
conflicting evidence about what the jury understood and intended, contrary to the rules
prohibiting such inquiry. Utah R. Evid. 606(b); see Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598,
603 (Utah 1983) (such evidence "is inadmissible as violative of the long-standing policy
12

against attempts to undermine the integrity of verdicts"). Moreover, perceived
"mistakes" in a verdict that are not evident on the face of the verdict are not correctable
through Rule 47(r)3 but are properly corrected by motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or motion for new trial, neither of which was filed here.
Long-established case law illustrates the meaning of an "informal or insufficient"
verdict, a legal standard that appears in rules and statutes of many other states, as well as
Utah. For example, in the leading case of Crowe v. Sacks, 283 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1955), the
jury in an auto accident case returned a verdict for the two plaintiffs in the respective
amounts of $2,500 and $3,000. The trial court, upon reading the verdict, expressed his
opinion that the "verdict is grossly inadequate." A juror responded that it was a
"compromise verdict," whereupon the court sent the jury out for further deliberation. Id.
at 692. The jury later returned with a revised verdict in the increased amounts of $8,500
and $11,000, and the court entered judgment on the revised verdict. Defense counsel
objected that the verdict was complete and enforceable as first rendered, and that the
court erred in requiring re-deliberation. Plaintiffs' counsel responded that the verdict was
properly "corrected" as "informal or insufficient" under the rules of civil procedure.
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by
interfering with the jury's verdict. Construing the rule that corresponds to our Rule 47(r),
the court defined an "informal' verdict as "defective in form; not in the usual form or
manner; contrary to custom or prescribed rule." Id. The court defined an "insufficient"
verdict as "inadequate for some need, purpose or use," as when it fails to "comprehend all
13

the issues submitted to the jury" or "goes beyond the issues of the case as stated in the
instructions." Id. Cited examples are when the verdict exceeds a statutory maximum or
includes improper items. The verdict in Crowe was not defective in form, and because "it
comprehended all the items of damage contained in the instructions . . ., regardless of
amount, it was not insufficient." Id. at 693 (emp. added). If the plaintiffs were
dissatisfied with the amount of the verdict, their proper remedy was a motion for new
trial. Id. Moreover, the trial court's statement that the verdict was inadequate, in effect,
instructed the jury to return a larger verdict. "It was a clear invasion of the province of
the jury to determine the amounts of damages to be awarded

It was an unwarranted

interference with the prerogative of the jury to determine the amounts." Id. at 694. The
court concluded:
The action of the judge in the correction of verdicts should be taken
with caution. He must not throw the weight of his influence into the
deliberations of the jury as to matters exclusively within its province....
s If the trial judge believes that the damages are inadequate, the proper
procedure is to set the verdict aside on motion for new trial. [Id.]
The leading Utah case construing Rule 47(r) cited and followed the definitions of
"informal" and "insufficient" set forth in Crowe v. Sacks. See Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383
P.2d 934, 935 n. 1 (Utah 1963). In Jorgensen, the Utah Supreme Court held that a general
damage verdict in the "odd amount" of $1,131.51 was properly questioned as a possible
quotient verdict. The court directed the jury to reconsider, and the jury returned with a
revised verdict in the round figure of $1,200. The Supreme Court upheld this procedure
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only "where it is apparent that there is some patent error in connection with the verdict."
Id. at 935 (emp. added).
Subsequent Utah cases illustrate this limited scope of relief under Rule 47(r). In
Brown v. Johnson, Ml P.2d 942 (Utah 1970), the court upheld correction of & special
damage verdict in the amount of $10,000 because it exceeded the instructed limit of
$377.50. Correction was justified because of "obvious error" "on the face" of the verdict.
Id. at 945. Similarly, in Langton v. International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211 (Utah
1971), a personal injury action, the court observed that the verdict was both "defective in
form" and "insufficient" because the jury "obviously" failed to include amounts for pain
and suffering and lost wages. Id. at 1214. The court distinguished such an "insufficient
or informal verdict and a verdict regular on its face, which awards inadequate damages ..
. . In the latter case, a new trial must be granted to correct the error." Id. at 1215 (emp.
added). Because plaintiffs counsel failed to object to the obvious deficiencies in the
verdict at the time it was rendered, relief under 47(r) was waived. Id. See also Ute-Cal
Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240, 1247-48 (Utah 1980) (verdict that
found injury but awarded no damages contained "patent insufficiency" to which counsel
was required to object to obtain relief under 47(r)); Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
1999 UT App 80, 977 P.2d 508, 517 ("Rule 47(r) relates to the form of the verdict, not the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting it," emp. added; Rule does not apply to verdict
regular on its face that is challenged for insufficiency of evidence); Cohn v. J.C Penney
Co., 537 P.2d 306, 311 (Utah 1975) (personal injury verdict for plaintiff that awarded no
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general damages was "deficient in form," but plaintiff waived the deficiency by failure to
object).1
Based on the foregoing case law, the jury's response to Special Verdict Question 5
was not "informal or insufficient" within the meaning of Rule 47(r). The verdict plainly
was not "informal" because it was not "defective in form." Neither Eggett nor Judge
Young has suggested that the verdict was not in proper form. The verdict was not
"insufficient" because it was completely adequate for its purpose and use, and it
comprehended all the issues submitted to the jury. See Crowe and Jorgensen, supra. The
verdict answered the "dispositive question" of the case, which was the book value of
Wasatch Energy. See Sam's Texaco, supra. Moreover, as discussed above, the jury's
number fell within the range of evidence presented by the parties. Certainly, the verdict
contained no "obvious" or "patent" error to indicate that the jury had ignored instructions
or had erroneously included, or failed to include, some element of damage in its
calculation. This case is thus easily distinguished from Jorgensen, Langton, and Brown v.
Johnson, relied upon by Eggett. Rather, the verdict here was "regular on its face'" and
the only concern of Judge Young was the adequacy of the damage amount under his view
of the evidence. Relief for inadequate damages under the evidence is obtained only by
motion for new trial, not by sua sponte "correction" under Rule 47(r). See Crowe,

1

Cases from other jurisdictions are consistent in considering a verdict "informal or insufficient" only
if it contains an obvious or patent error unrelated to adequacy of damages or sufficiency of evidence.
See, e.g., State ex rel Sam's Texaco & Towing, Inc. v. Gallagher, 842 P.2d 383, 387-88 (Or. 1992) Qmy
verdict that answers "dispositive question" " is sufficient even if other questions are not answered," and
trial court "erred in refusing to accept it").
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Langton, and Stevenett, supra. Accordingly, Judge Young plainly erred in refusing to
accept the jury's completed verdict and, instead, leading the jury to a higher damage
award. Crowe v. Sacks, supra, at 694 (court's expressed opinion on inadequacy of verdict
"was a clear invasion of the province of the jury").
C.

The Trial Court's Error Was Not "Harmless."
Eggett argues that any error by the trial court in questioning the jury and revising

Question 5 to obtain a different result was "harmless" because the jury actually intended
to award Eggett the full $135,672. (Br. of Aplee. 41-42.) In other words, a judge may
ignore established rules and procedures, and even invade the province of the jury, as long
as he achieves a "fair" result. This argument is not only wrong as a matter of law, it
would, if approved by this Court, mark a drastic change and work untold mischief on the
entire jury system. Judges would be free to inquire into every verdict to determine how it
was reached, to verify jury intent, and to "correct" unintended or "unjust" results. The
law forbids such judicial forays into the exclusive province of the jury.
Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, states:
Upon inquiry into the validity of a verdict. . ., a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind... as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the
verdict... or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection
therewith . . . . Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by
the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded
from testifying be received for these purposes. [Emp. added.]
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Accordingly, judicial inquiry into the jury's intent, deliberations, calculations, or mental
processes, beyond the authorized polling of the jury as to its written verdict, is
impermissible. Moreover, evidence that would be inadmissible by juror affidavit, such as
the process by which damages were calculated, cannot be interjected by a party in
circumvention of the rule. As clearly held in Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, supra:
It is well settled that the only evidence admissible to impeach a jury
verdict is that which demonstrates that the verdict was determined by
chance or resulted from bribery. All other proof as to what was said or
done in the jury room, including evidence that the jury was confused or that
it misunderstood or disregarded the facts or the applicable law, is
inadmissible as violative of the long-standing policy against attempts to
undermine the integrity of verdicts. [667 P.2d at 603, emp. added, citations
omitted.]
Here, Eggett asserts that he knows how the jury calculated its verdict of
$135,671.96, by adding one of his adjustments to the audited book value and then
multiplying that figure by his 36.5 percent. Eggett concludes from this calculation that
the jury must have intended to award him the full $135,671.96. (Br. of Aplee. 37.)
However, because there is no record evidence of the jury's mental processes and
calculations, Eggett's assertion remains inadmissible speculation. The Special Verdict
form plainly asked the jury to determine the book value of Wasatch Energy (Add. 8), and
the jury was clearly instructed to answer only the questions asked. "It is your duty to
make findings of fact as to the questions I will submit to you." (Instruction 20, Tr. 919,
emp. added.) The judge read and submitted Question 5, stating, "[W]hat was the book
value of Wasatch Energy as defined by the shareholder agreement? And then there is a
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line for you to place the value . . . . " (Tr. 927.) Accordingly, the jury was not asked, and
was not authorized to answer, the different question regarding the book value of Eggett's
shares. A jury is bound to answer the question asked, and courts are not permitted to
speculate that the jury may have been answering a different question. Moreover, this
Court cannot rely on Eggett's speculation of how the jury calculated its response to a
question that was not asked, when that same evidence would be inadmissible from the
jurors themselves.
Eggett argues that alteration of the verdict was required to conform with actual
juror intent. However, the intent of the law is to preserve the "integrity of verdicts," even
though the jury may have been "confused," "misunderstood" the law, or even intended a
different result. Groen, supra, at 603. For example, in Cooper v. Evans, 262 P.2d 278
(Utah 1953), the jury found in a special verdict that the plaintiff had been contributorily
negligent. As a result of this finding, the court entered judgment for defendants. When
the court advised the jury of "the judgment required by their findings, several members of
the jury voiced disapproval, claiming they had misunderstood; and that the result was not
as they desired." Id. at 279. However, the court refused to change the verdict, despite
juror "disappointment or even confusion." Id. The jury verdict was valid and binding
even though the jury intended a different result and did not understand the legal
consequences of its findings. Id. at 281. See also Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317,
1321 (Utah App. 1988) (juror confusion as to effect of its finding does not invalidate
verdict); State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1972) Quror misunderstanding of law,
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instructions, or effect of verdict, and the jury's "process of reasoning in arriving at a
verdict," cannot be relied upon to challenge the verdict).
Finally, the trial court's error was plainly prejudicial, as his changing of the verdict
question, probing of the jury, and expression of his own opinions led to an increase in the
verdict from $49,520 (36.5 percent of $135, 671.96) to the full $135,671.96.
To clarify the actual sequence of events, Judge Young first read all the verdict
questions and answers. (Tr. 988-89.) He then went back to Question 5 and asked the jury
the revised, ambiguous question of whether $135,671.61 is "the value that the jury
believes should be paid for the shares?" (Tr. 989.) The foreman responded, "We believe
that to be the book value." (Tr. 990.) Judge Young then stated, "I think the question was
confusing." (Id.) Denying the objection of defense counsel that the verdict should be
enforced as asked and answered, Judge Young then opined that the answer was a
"mistake." (Id.) The judge then asked a different question, whether the figure given is
the amount owed to Mr. Eggett. Following the judge's lead, and apparently accepting the
judge's opinion that the question was "confusing" and the answer a "mistake," the
foreman answered, "Yes." (Id.) The judge rejected the objection of defense counsel that
the verdict was phrased as discussed throughout the trial and opined that the jury did not
intend the answer it gave. (Tr. 991.) Judge Young then "polled" the jury with a
confusing, compound question, attempting to ask the jury if it calculated the $135,000
from a larger number or intended to award Eggett a percentage of that figure. To that
compound question, the jurors answered, "Yes," leaving their true intent unclear. (Tr.
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991-93.) Judge Young then repeated that the written question was "ambiguous" and
entered judgment for the full $135,671.96, even though the only verdict signed by the jury
shows that amount as the book value of Wasatch Energy. (Tr. 993.) In denying a third
objection of defense counsel, Judge Young concluded with his opinion that the written
verdict was inadequate, as not supported by the evidence. (Tr. 994-95.)
By this procedure, Judge Young plainly invaded the province of the jury; probed
into its deliberations, calculations, intent, and mental processes; and carefully coerced the
jury, with his own opinions of confusion and mistake, to the conclusion that Eggett was
entitled to the full $135,000. The court's alteration of the verdict question plainly led the
jury to a different result from what the verdict states, an action "inconsistent with
substantial justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 61. Therefore, the error was prejudicial, and the
court's action must be reversed.
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES
FOR CLAIMS NOT COVERED BY THE ATTORNEY FEE
PROVISION.
As Eggett concedes, the only attorney fee provision is found in the Shareholders'
Agreement, authorizing fees to the prevailing party in an action to enforce that agreement.
(Br. of Aplee. 42.) The only claim based in that agreement is the claim for book value of
Eggett's stock. Therefore, only those attorney fees incurred in pursuing the stock claim
are recoverable. Fees incurred in pursuing the employment, compensation, and bad faith
claims are not recoverable.
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Eggett claims that he properly apportioned fees between the stock and other
claims, but only for the time period prior to May 16, 1997. (Br. of Aplee. 44.) That was
before this action was even commenced; moreover, that "apportionment" reduced
claimed attorney fees by a mere $1,300. (Add. 84-85.) Wasatch is concerned about
apportionment of the remaining $60,000 in attorney fees. Eggett makes the canned,
conclusory assertion that the stock claim is "inextricably intertwined" with his other
claims, but he points to no evidence or court findings to support the assertion. The truth
is, as Wasatch demonstrated with record citations, the stock and compensation claims
were treated separately throughout discovery and trial. (Br. of App. 36-37.) The amount
claimed for stock under the Shareholders' Agreement is plainly distinct from the amount
claimed for compensation under the Employment Agreement. Even if the two claims
were considered related, they would still not be "inextricably intertwined" as to preclude
apportionment. Certainly, if required, Eggett could separate his fees for the two different
claims. Contrary to Eggett's statement of the law, recovery of fees for one claim does not
automatically permit recovery of fees for all claims.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the judgment of the district
court. Judgment for the book value of Eggett's stock should be limited to the agreed
amount of $27,540, as set forth in the audited financial statement. Alternatively,
judgment should be limited to $49,520, based on the written and signed jury verdict. If
this Court does not enforce the Shareholders' Agreement, it should at least enforce the
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jury verdict. In addition, the attorney fee award should be limited to the amount incurred
in obtaining the book value of Eggett's stock. Finally, Wasatch should be awarded its
attorney fees and costs incurred on this appeal.
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